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THE CRIMINAL MIND: NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN SENTENCING IN NEW 
SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA 
Ellie A. Page† 
Abstract:  “Neurolaw” is the emerging field of Law and Neuroscience that has the 
potential to lend insight into an offender’s mental state and influence criminal 
responsibility.  In New South Wales, Australia, courts allow neuroscientific evidence of 
an offender’s cognitive impairment as a consideration in sentencing proceedings.  In this 
comment, I discuss the discretionary nature of New South Wales’ sentencing regime and 
the limitations of how neuroscience may be utilized within that regime.  Although 
neuroscientists can address the association of an offender’s cognitive impairment with the 
commission of a crime, they cannot identify, with certainty, a causal relationship.  I 
analyze an original compilation of six case studies from New South Wales to illustrate 
that sentencing judges resist mitigating offenders’ sentences based on evidence of a 
cognitive impairment unless there are other factors favorable to the offender, such as a 
guilty plea or a lack of criminal history.  Judges’ resistance to using evidence of a 
cognitive impairment alone to significantly mitigate an offender’s sentence indicates that 
judges regard evidence of cognitive dysfunction as simply one factor in the holistic 
framework at their discretion in sentencing, likely due to the lack of certainty surrounding 
the nature of the relationship between an offender’s impairment and the commission of 
the crime.  Judges’ reluctance to use neuroscience as a significant mitigating factor also 
maintains implications for the sustained retributivist nature of the criminal justice system 
in New South Wales and raises the issue of whether the judiciary is the appropriate body 
to apply neuroscience to the law. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
On June 4, 2011 at 1:30 a.m. in New South Wales, Australia, 35-year-
old Taskin Aslan approached the complainant as she walked toward a hotel.1 
Aslan put his arm around her shoulders and forced her toward the entrance 
of a nearby church.2  He then sexually assaulted the complainant.3  
Aslan’s alcoholic father abused him as a child.4  He began using drugs 
and alcohol at age twelve, and had a lengthy criminal history by the age of 
eighteen.5 In his mid-twenties, Aslan was involved in two motor vehicle 
accidents, after which neurological assessments revealed brain damage.6  
Soon after the accidents, a clinical neuropsychologist reported that Aslan’s 
                                                
†  J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law class of 2017.  The author would 
like to thank her family for enduring her relentless thoughts about neurolaw.    
1  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).   
2  Id. at 4. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 10. 
5  Id. at 10–11. 
6  Id. at 13. 
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dysfunction in executive control,7 including inhibition difficulties, was 
consistent with post-concussional disorder associated with traumatic brain 
injury.8  In 2012, psychiatrist, Dr. Allnutt, reported that Aslan possibly 
suffered ongoing cognitive difficulties as a consequence of his head injury, 
such as impulsivity and poor judgment.9  The Court of Criminal Appeal 
affirmed the District Court’s holding that Aslan’s brain injury did not 
directly influence the commission of the 2011 offense and upheld the 
aggregated sentence of a non-parole period of six years10 for one count of 
indecent assault, one of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and 
two of sexual intercourse without consent.11  
Modern brain science, including neuroimaging technologies and 
advanced neurological assessments as reflected in Mr. Aslan’s case, has 
materialized on the legal scene primarily over the last decade due to the 
emerging12 field of Law and Neuroscience known as “Neurolaw.”13  In Law 
and Neuroscience, Professor of Law and Biology at Vanderbilt University 
and Director of the MacArthur Foundation on Law and Neuroscience, Owen 
Jones, attributes the rise of Neurolaw to two factors: the nature of the legal 
system and advancements in cognitive neuroscience.14  Criminal law in 
particular largely revolves around the defendant's state of mind because it 
requires both a bad act and a culpable state of mind.15  It raises questions 
such as, what were the intentions of the alleged offender?  Is the defendant 
morally responsible?  Did the defendant have the capacity to act 
differently?16  Many relevant inquiries concerning the culpability of the 
                                                
7  “Executive control” or “cognitive control,” discussed further in Part III, is defined as the deliberate 
control of action, thought, and emotion necessary to respond to changing environmental conditions.  It is 
typically identified with the prefrontal cortex region of the brain, also discussed in Part III. Glossary, in 
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 757 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).   
8  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).   
9  Id. at 19. 
10  Id. at 3, 51. 
11  Id. at 1. 
12  In my research, I accessed a Neurolaw Database created by the University of Sydney and 
Macquarie University, which contains Australian case law involving the use of neuroscientific evidence in 
sentencing.  The Database has over 100 criminal cases, only four of which predate 2000.  Australian 
Neurolaw Database, MACQUARIE UNIV. AND THE LAW SCHOOL AT THE UNIV. OF SYDNEY (2015), 
https://neurolaw.edu.au/home.  In addition, a 2014 neuroscience textbook edited by three neurolaw 
scholars, states that 86 percent of the publications and cases included in the book were published only since 
2000, and nearly 60 percent of those materials were published between 2008 and 2013.  Law and 
Neuroscience: An Overview of the Issues, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 4 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).   
13  Owen D. Jones & Matthew Ginther, Law and Neuroscience, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 13, 489 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 492. 
16  Id. at 489. 
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defendant therefore require, to varying degrees, an analysis of the 
defendant's cognitive abilities,17 an assessment of which may suggest, for 
example, that the defendant has impaired impulse control.18 
Technological developments related to brain imaging make available 
objective, reliable information about the structural and functional aspects of 
the brain that may aid judges and juries in understanding a defendant’s state 
of mind.19  Namely, cognitive neuroscience may speak to two aspects of 
criminal responsibility: intention and sanity.20  However, as Professor Jones 
asserts, the legal system must find a way to interpret neuroscientific 
evidence in a way that is appropriate because “[Neuroscience] is one of 
those things that holds both promise and terror for the legal system.”21 
 Professor Jones’ concerns about the nebulous future of neuroscience 
in the courtroom contribute to an understanding of why sentencing judges in 
New South Wales, Australia are not using neurological evidence of 
offenders’ cognitive impairments to substantially mitigate their sentences, 
even though they have the discretionary power to do so.  The Law School at 
the University of Sydney in Australia and Sydney’s Macquarie University 
created an Australian Neurolaw Database in 2015, which contains case law 
involving the use of neuroscientific evidence in sentencing.22  Many of the 
criminal law-related cases maintained in the Database were decided in New 
South Wales, a southeastern state in Australia, which is where I focus my 
analysis.   
In Part II of my comment, I will give a brief overview of Australia’s 
judiciary and discuss Australia’s sentencing regime with an emphasis on 
New South Wales.  In addition, I will outline the sentencing considerations 
judges in New South Wales utilize to mitigate offenders’ sentences, with an 
emphasis on four mitigation principles developed through case law that 
judges apply, at their discretion, when sentencing offenders with a mental 
impairment.  In Part III, I will discuss the advantages and limitations of 
                                                
17  Id. 
18  See ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE 65–68 (2014).   
19  Id. 
20  Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility? 
Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 145, 145 (2008).   
21  Kevin Davis, Brain Trials: Neuroscience is Taking a Stand in the Courtroom, ABA J. (Nov.  01, 
2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/brain_trials_neuroscience_is_taking_a_stand_in_the_c
ourtroom/ (emphasizing that neuroscientific evidence must be viewed and interpreted cautiously and 
weighed with other evidence because it does not yet definitively explain criminal behavior).   
22  Australian Neurolaw Database, MACQUARIE UNIV. AND THE LAW SCHOOL AT THE UNIV. OF 
SYDNEY (2015), https://neurolaw.edu.au/home. 
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neuroscience in the courtroom, with an emphasis on the sentencing phase of 
criminal trials.  I will focus on how neuroscience has the ability to help 
mitigate the sentences of offenders who commit serious crimes, such as 
violent or sexually motivated offenses.  In Parts IV and V, I will do a novel 
analysis of six case studies from New South Wales.  The cases illustrate that 
sentencing judges are resistant to significantly mitigating an offender’s 
sentence based on neuroscientific evidence of a cognitive impairment, which 
is used to inform four mitigation principles articulated in case law unless 
there are additional factors favorable to the offender.  Favorable factors may 
include a guilty plea, no criminal history, or factual circumstances that 
suggest the offense was out-of-character for the offender.  I assert that 
mitigation only in these select circumstances reveals that sentencing judges 
are reluctant to use evidence of cognitive dysfunction as more than a single 
factor in the holistic framework that determines an offender’s sentence.  I 
posit that judges are reluctant because neuroscience is not yet sufficiently 
developed to allow a sentencing judge to identify a causal link between an 
offender’s brain impairment and the commission of the crime.  Neuroscience 
is therefore not yet able to fully elucidate the psychology of criminal 
responsibility.  In addition, judges may lack the necessary expertise to apply 
neuroscience in sentencing. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON SENTENCING IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
Australia is comprised of six states, including New South Wales, and 
two territories.23  It has a common law system, and maintains both federal 
and state-level courts.24  The states and territories are self-governing, 
meaning they are separate jurisdictions that each make their own laws.25  
New South Wales’ trial courts are divided into three levels, each with 
separate jurisdiction.  At the lowest level is the Local Court, which handles 
the least serious criminal matters, including “summary offences,”26 such as 
stealing and possession of drugs.27  The “middle court” is the District Court, 
                                                
23  Foreign Law Guide: Australia, BRILLONLINE REFERENCE WORKS (2015).   
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  “Summary offenses” are lower-level criminal offenses that can only be heard and decided by a 
magistrate, see Summary Offences, LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch12s04s01.php. 
27 Role of New South Wales Courts and Tribunals, NSW GOV’T (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://www.courts.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/cats/which_court_or_tribunal/jurisdiction.aspx. 
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which has jurisdiction over “indictable offenses”28 except murder, treason, 
and piracy.29  The highest trial court is the New South Wales Supreme 
Court, which deals with the most serious criminal matters, such as murder 
and manslaughter, attempted murder, and treason.30  The New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal is the highest court for criminal matters and hears 
appeals from the Supreme Court in addition to others.31  At the federal level 
there are four main courts, the highest being the High Court of Australia, 
which hears final appeals on criminal matters from federal, state, and 
territory courts throughout the country.32  
New South Wales has legislation that comprises a sentencing 
framework33 subject to common law.34  Sentencing is largely entrusted to the 
judiciary, the idea being that individual judges, not the legislature, should 
dictate the sentencing process.35  This form of individualized justice can be 
characterized as “instinctive synthesis,” meaning all considerations are 
simultaneously balanced and weighed by the sentencing judge.36  However, 
there are some mechanisms used to constrain judicial discretion; these 
include guideline judgments, mandatory minimum sentences, standard non-
parole periods, and aggravating and mitigating factors, which are explored 
below.37 
                                                
28  “Indictable offenses” are those for which the defendant has the right to trial by jury, see Indictable 
Offences, LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch13s03.php. 
29  Role of New South Wales Courts and Tribunals, NSW GOV’T (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://www.courts.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/cats/which_court_or_tribunal/jurisdiction.aspx. 
30  Common Law Division, SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/sco2_aboutus/sco2_divisionssupremecourt/sco2_comm
onlawdivision.aspx. 
31  Court of Criminal Appeal, SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/sco2_aboutus/sco2_courtofcriminalappeal.aspx. 
32 Role of the High Court, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA (2010),  
http://www.hcourt.gov.au.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/about/role-of-the-high-court.   
33  Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sentencing-
guidelines/australia.php.   
34  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(4) (“The court is not to have regard to any 
such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do 
so.”); see also R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA para 23 (17 June 2004) (Austl.) (delineating the line of 
authority making legislation subject to common law). 
35  Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33. 
36  Id. With growing concern about sentencing inconsistencies, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission completed a report on the sentencing of federal offenders in 2006.  The report recommended 
the adoption of an appointed commission to develop standardized numerical sentencing guidelines as is 
practiced in the United States and the United Kingdom, but Australia did not follow the recommendation.  
Australian courts generally perceived the idea of federal sentencing guidelines as contrary to individualized 
justice. 
37  Id. 
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A. Guideline Judgments Have Limited Application  
“Guideline judgments” are sentencing guidelines that apply to 
particular offenses and penalties, as well as to classes of offenses, penalties, 
and offenders.38  Guidelines are applied at the judge’s discretion, and are 
considered in addition to other statutory factors, such as aggravating and 
mitigating factors.39  The New South Wales Crime (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 authorizes the Court of Criminal Appeal to give a guideline 
judgment on the application of the Attorney General or on the Court’s own 
motion.40  There are six guideline judgments applicable in New South Wales 
that relate to select crimes and sentencing penalties.41  The Court has issued 
no new guidelines since 2004, in part because courts are concerned the 
guidelines could infringe on constitutional provisions related to the 
separation of powers.42  Although guideline judgments have limited impact 
because they are discretionary and narrow in scope due to separation of 
powers concerns, there are additional means used to reconcile sentencing 
discrepancies. 
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentences Are Discretionary 
An additional mechanism for ameliorating sentencing disparities is 
mandatory minimum sentences issued by the legislature.43  In New South 
Wales, the Crimes Act 1900 prescribes mandatory maximum and minimum 
penalties.44  However, the New South Wales Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 explicitly makes sentencing discretionary, even in the case of 
mandatory minimums.  Section 21(2) specifies: “If by any provision of an 
Act or statutory rule an offender is made liable to imprisonment for a 
specified term, a court may nevertheless impose a sentence of imprisonment 
for a lesser term.”45  Mandatory minimums are therefore not statutorily 
mandatory unless legislation specifies that the mandatory minimum is 
                                                
38  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 36. 
39  Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33; see also Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW) s 36–42A. 
40  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 36–37A. 
41  The six guideline judgments relate to: armed robbery; dangerous driving causing death or grievous 
bodily harm; discounts for pleading guilty; taking further offenses into account; break, enter, and steal; and 
high-range drink driving.  See Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33. 
42  Id.  (citing R v Wong & Leung [1999] NSWCCA 420 (explaining that the federal High Court 
overruled a guideline judgment related to drug importation due to its inconsistency with federal 
legislation)). 
43  Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33; see also Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
44  Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33; see also Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW). 
45  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21(2). 
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required regardless of Section 21 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act.46 Thus, with limited exceptions, sentencing is subject to the court’s 
discretion in New South Wales. 
C. Standard Non-Parole Periods Are Discretionary, but Deviation 
Must Be Justified 
An offender’s sentence is further guided by the provisions of New 
South Wales’ Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 that require a 
standard non-parole approach.47  Part 4, Div 1A of the Act includes a table 
that outlines the standard non-parole periods for numerous offenses defined 
by the Crimes Act 1900.48  The non-parole periods for the specific offenses 
delineated in Div 1A are representative of the sentences for offenses in the 
middle of the range of objective seriousness.49  For example, the standard 
non-parole period for reckless causing of grievous bodily harm is four 
years.50  The sentencing judge must consider the standard non-parole period 
in his or her sentencing considerations51 and make “a value judgment as to 
what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case.”52  Section 
21(a)(1)(c) of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 requires the 
sentencing judge to account for any objective or subjective factors that affect 
the seriousness of the offense.53  Although the standard non-parole periods 
for the offenses outlined in Div 1A are nonbinding, the court must make a 
                                                
46   There are only two offenses in New South Wales—assault causing death when intoxicated and 
murder of police officers—carry mandatory minimums of eight years and life respectively, and nothing in 
Section 21 or any other provision of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act can authorize a lesser sentence. 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 25B(2), 19B(4). 
47  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 44, pt 4 div 1A. 
48  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) pt 4 div 1A Table. 
49  See Muldrock v The Queen [2011] 249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.). 
50  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) pt 4 div 1A Table item 4B. 
51  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 54B. 
52  Muldrock v The Queen [2011] 249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.) (quoting Markarian v The Queen 
[2005] 244 CLR 357 (HCA) (Austl.)).   
53  The case law does not make clear whether factors personal to the offender may be used to 
determine the objective seriousness of an offense.  In R v Way (2004), the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal delineated a number of factors affecting the objective seriousness of an offense, including 
the offender’s motivation, mental illness, or intellectual disability.  R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131 (Austl.).  
However, in Muldrock v The Queen (2011), the High Court of Australia held that “[T]he objective 
seriousness of an offense is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender . . . 
[and] is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending.  Muldrock v The Queen [2011] 
249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.). Subsequent to Muldrock, in Martin v R (2015), the New South Wales Court 
of Criminal Appeal held that the applicant’s mental state at the time of the offense may influence the 
objective seriousness of the offense.  Martin v R [2015] NSWCCA 48–53 (10 February 2015) (Austl.).  
Thus, whether the Way factors are matters affecting the objective seriousness of the offense or whether they 
are matters personal to the offender is unclear post Muldrock.   
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record of its reasons for setting a non-parole period that deviates from the 
standard.54  
D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Sentencing May Be 
Used at a Court’s Discretion 
The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act also delineates aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and maintains that a court may use them to increase 
or decrease an offender’s sentence.55  The mitigating factors include, among 
others, that the offender is unlikely to re-offend or the offender is a person of 
good character.56  In addition, if an offender is suffering from a mental illness, 
intellectual handicap, or other mental or emotional impairment or disability, 
the courts have developed five principles (“Principles”) to be applied when 
sentencing, four of which are mitigatory.  However, none of these Principles 
are absolute and the court may use its discretion in deciding whether to 
reduce an offender's sentence based on one or more of the factors.57  “Over 
the years the applicable principles have evolved,” but were recently and 
clearly re-stated in Aslan v R; they are as follows: 
[Principle 1] Where the state of a person’s mental health 
contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, 
the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced.  Consequently 
the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a 
reduction in the sentence… 
[Principle 2] It may also have the consequence that an offender 
is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a 
reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been 
imposed… 
[Principle 3] It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh 
more heavily on the person.  Because the sentence will be more 
onerous for that person the length of the prison term or the 
conditions under which it is served may be reduced . . . 
                                                
54  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 54B(3); see also Muldrock v The Queen [2011] 
249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.) (holding that div 1A requires sentencing judges to state fully the reasons for 
arriving at the sentence imposed, which assists in appellate review).   
55  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)–(5). 
56  Id. s 21A(3). 
57  Id. s 21A(5). 
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[Principle 4] It may reduce or eliminate the significance of 
specific deterrence . . .   
[Principle 5] Conversely, it may be that because of a person's 
mental illness, they present more of a danger to the community.  
In those circumstances, considerations of specific deterrence 
may result in an increased sentence . . . Where a person has 
been diagnosed with an Antisocial Personality Disorder there 
may be a particular need to give consideration to the protection 
of the public. . .” (internal citations omitted, italics added).58 
Guideline judgments, mandatory minimums, standard non-parole 
periods, and aggravating and mitigating factors encourage limited 
consistency in sentencing because sentencing judges maintain great 
discretion.  Judges retain the power to decide how they will weigh particular 
considerations and which factors will contribute to their sentencing decisions 
as part of the instinctive synthesis judicial model.   
III. THE SCIENCE OF NEUROLAW 
Recently, science has made significant advancements in 
understanding the brain.  Aristotle thought the organ was a radiator to cool 
blood, while Descartes thought it was an antenna for the spirit to 
communicate with the body.59  Neuroscience has developed to the extent that 
it is being introduced as evidence in the courtroom to support or challenge 
the degree of an offender's culpable mental state or to gauge an offender’s 
level of danger.60  A function of the legal system is to determine how and 
why a person behaved as he or she did and to allocate punishment 
accordingly, which neuroscience can sometimes help illuminate.61   There 
are two broad roles of neuroscience in law: to deepen psychological 
knowledge concerning criminal responsibility, which I discuss in this 
comment, and to generate new tools for purposes of reducing recidivism or 
enabling direct brain interventions.62  In its current state, however, there 
remain limitations on the degree to which neuroscience can inform criminal 
law.   Neuroscience is not yet sufficiently developed to determine causality 
                                                
58  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.) (citing Director of Public Prosecutions v 
De La Rosa [2010] 177 NSWCCA 177 (17 December 2010) (Austl.)). 
59  See RAINE, supra note 18, at 65.   
60  Owen D. Jones et. al., Law and Neuroscience, THE JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE 17624, 17624 
(2013) [hereinafter Jones et. al., Law and Neuroscience]. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 17628. 
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between an offender’s brain dysfunction and the commission of a crime with 
adequate certainty to absolve an offender of his or her mental culpability and 
therefore, of criminal responsibility.63  A determination of how 
neuroscientific evidence could be used to negate an offender’s mental state 
and thereby mitigate an offender’s culpability in the “guilt phase”64 of a 
criminal trial is beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, an analysis of how 
neuroscientific evidence of a cognitive impairment can be used in the 
“sentencing phase”65 to reduce an offender’s sentence within the framework 
of the four mitigating Principles articulated in the case law66 is more 
compatible with the current state of neuroscience.  To better identify how 
neuroscience can be used in the courtroom, it is important to understand the 
role of neuroscientific imaging tools, applicable brain anatomy, how 
structural and/or functional brain abnormalities can manifest, the current 
limitations of neuroscience, and how these limitations complicate the use of 
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom.   
A. Neuroscientific Tools Are Used to Detect Structural and 
Functional Brain Impairment 
The two broad categories of scans used to detect brain dysfunction are 
structural and functional scans.67  Structural scans are used to evaluate the 
structure of the brain to detect injury and large-scale disease, such as a 
tumor.68  Functional imaging attributes functional roles to specific brain 
regions by enabling information processing by brain centers to be visualized 
directly; processing causes the involved area of the brain to increase glucose 
metabolism and “light up” on the scan.69  Two of the most utilized imaging 
tools are the MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), which provides both 
                                                
63  See Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE REVS. 730, 734 (2013) [hereinafter 
Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court] 
64  “Guilt phase” refers to the portion of criminal proceedings in which the defendant pleads guilty, is 
found guilty, or is acquitted.  What are the different stages of an average court case? NSW COURTS (Sep.  
21, 2016), http://nswcourts.com.au/articles/what-are-the-different-stages-of-an-average-court-case/. 
65  “Sentencing phase” refers to the portion of criminal proceedings after the defendant has plead 
guilty or is found guilty, and the judge hands down a sentence.  What are the different stages of an average 
court case? NSW COURTS (Sep. 21, 2016), http://nswcourts.com.au/articles/what-are-the-different-stages-
of-an-average-court-case/. 
66  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.) (citing Director of Public Prosecutions v 
De La Rosa [2010] 177 NSWCCA 177 (17 December 2010) (Austl.)). 
67  For a detailed explanation of the various brain imaging tools available, see Brain Monitoring and 
Manipulation, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 221–33 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).   
68 Brain Imaging, SEMEL INST. FOR NEUROSCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR: UCLA (2011), 
https://www.semel.ucla.edu/taxonomy_view/19/505?type=group.   
69  Id. 
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structural and functional information,70 and the PET (positron-emission 
tomography) scan, which is a purely functional scan.71 
The effects of structural and/or functional brain impairment vary 
depending on which part of the brain is dysfunctional.  Most relevant to 
neurolaw is the frontal lobe, which is the largest of the four lobes of the 
brain and constitutes the most frontal region of the brain.72  The frontal lobe 
controls motor and executive functions, including the ability to navigate 
social relationships, communicate, and plan.73  The frontal lobe is further 
divided into three areas based on function, including the prefrontal cortex,74 
which sits right above the eyes immediately behind the forehead.75  The 
prefrontal cortex is regarded as the “CEO” of the brain and is responsible for 
the highest-level control of behavior and decision-making power.76  It is 
critical for the ability to predict outcomes, delay gratification, compare 
multiple options, assess risk, and adapt to changing circumstances.77  
To better recognize the contribution that neuroscience can make and 
the pivotal role of the prefrontal cortex in decision making, consider the 
work of Dr. Adrian Raine, a Professor of Criminology, Psychiatry and 
Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania.78  Raine is a leading authority 
on the biology of violence and is the first person to have conducted a brain 
imaging study on murderers.79  In 1994, Raine sought to measure the 
functional capacity of the brains of forty-one accused murderers and forty-
one controls by using the PET scan, which, as an imaging tool that measures 
brain function, documents how well different parts of the brain metabolize 
glucose.80  He hypothesized that the brains of murderers would use less 
glucose, a sign of lower or non-activation, compared to the brains of the 
control group.81   His study confirmed that this is, indeed, the case, and 
provided the first brain-imaging evidence to show that the brains of a large 
                                                
70 What is fMRI?, CTR. FOR FUNCTIONAL MRI: UC SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (2016), 
http://fmri.ucsd.edu/Research/whatisfmri.html. 
71  RAINE, supra note 18, at 66; see also Valentina Berti et al., PET/CT in Diagnosis of Dementia, 
1228 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.  81(2011). 
72  Brain Structure and Function, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 207 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).    
73  Id. at 209. 
74  See RAINE, supra note 18, at 66. 
75  Brain Structure and Function, supra note 72, at 207. 
76  Id. at 210. 
77  Id. at 211.   
78  See RAINE, supra note 18. 
79  Id. at 68; see also Criminologist Believes Violent Behavior is Biological, NPR (March 21.  2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/03/21/292375166/criminologist-believes-violent-behavior-is-biological. 
80  RAINE, supra note 18, at 65–67. 
81  Id. 
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sample of murderers are functionally different from those of the general 
population.82  Overall, the forty-one murderers showed a considerable 
reduction in prefrontal glucose metabolism compared with the controls, 
meaning a reduction in activation.83 This abnormality in the prefrontal cortex 
manifests itself at numerous levels: 
1. At an emotional level, reduced prefrontal cortex functioning results in 
loss of control over the limbic system, which controls emotions like 
anger and rage.84 
2. At a behavioral level, research on neurological patients with prefrontal 
cortex damage indicates an increase in risk-taking, irresponsibility, 
and rule-breaking.85  
3. At a personality level, frontal damage is associated with impulsivity, 
loss of self-control, and inability to modify and inhibit behavior 
appropriately.86 
4. At a social level, abnormality can translate into poor social 
judgment.87 
5. At a cognitive level, prefrontal cortex dysfunction can manifest as a 
loss of intellectual flexibility, and poor problem-solving skills.88 
There are therefore five reasons to expect that impaired prefrontal cortex 
functioning could predispose a person to violence.89  Raine asserts that “poor 
prefrontal cortex functioning is the best-replicated90 correlate of antisocial 
and violent behavior.”91 
                                                
82  Id. at 68. 
83  Id. at 66–67. 
84  Id. at 67. 
85  Id. 
86  Id.   
87  Id. at 68. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Note, however, that not all violent offenders have poor prefrontal cortex functioning.  There is a 
reactive-proactive aggression spectrum that reflects brain function.  For example, while most murders are 
on the reactive-aggression side, “predatory killers,” who are often serial killers, are on the proactive-
aggression side and have good prefrontal cortex function, which allows them to carefully plan their 
criminal acts.  For further discussion, see RAINE, supra note 18, at 78–80; see also Adrian Raine et al., The 
Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire: Differential Correlates of Reactive and Proactive 
Aggression in Adolescent Boys, 32 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 159 (2010). 
91  RAINE, supra note 18, at 68; accord Norman Relkin et al., Impulsive Homicide Associated with an 
Arachnoid Cyst and Unilateral Frontotemporal Cerebral Dysfunction, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 53 
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Although there are multiple brain areas that can predispose someone to 
violence, the region of the brain most indicative of violence when 
dysfunctional is the prefrontal cortex.92  Raine therefore argues that repeated 
violent offending may be perceived as a clinical disorder.93  However, Raine 
also acknowledges the limitations of neuroscience and admits that “the 
antisocial brain is a patchwork of dysfunctional neural systems and we are 
only just on the threshold of putting together these neural pieces to better 
understand it.”94  
B. The Application of Neuroscience to Criminal Law Is Limited in 
Scope  
The extent to which neuroscience can be applied in a legal context 
remains limited as neuroscience continues to develop and the brain’s 
intricate systems leave much to be discovered.  As Raine indicated, there is 
ambiguity concerning how structural and functional impairment of the brain 
may affect an individual’s state of mind and an individual’s ability to control 
his or her actions.  Stephen Morse from the University of Pennsylvania 
asserts that the pressing question is whether the developments in 
neuroscience are even legally relevant because neuroscience only makes a 
proposition about responsibility more or less likely to be true.95  For 
example, fMRI studies deal in average differences between groups, meaning 
there is some overlap between normal and abnormal brain function.96  This 
lack of specificity poses a challenge to the introduction of neuroscientific 
evidence in criminal proceedings.   
Generally, in order to establish legal relevance, an expert must be able 
to explain how the neuro-evidence informs whether the specific defendant 
acted, whether he or she formed the required mens rea, or whether he or she 
met the criteria for an excusing condition.97  Science has advanced to the 
point that we know a functioning brain is a necessary condition for 
possessing a mental state and for acting, but we do not know how mental 
states and action are caused; we do not have sophisticated causal knowledge 
                                                                                                                                            
(Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014) (asserting that one of the known effects of prefrontal dysfunction is a 
predisposition to stimulus-bound aggression). 
92  RAINE, supra note 18, at 98–99. 
93  Id. at 336. 
94  Id. at 99. 
95  Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Promise of 
Neuroscience, 99 MARQUETTE L. REV. 39, 58 (2015). 
96  Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: Head Case, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 7 (Owen Jones et al.  
eds., 2014).   
97  Id. 
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of how the brain works generally.98  Morse argues that although 
neuroscience currently may not be able to contribute to more accurate 
criminal law policy, doctrine, or individual case adjudication in the guilt 
phase, advances in technology and science may allow us to better understand 
criminal behavior in the future.99  Though neuroscience is not yet 
sufficiently advanced to allow for definitive conclusions about cause and 
effect as Morse suggests, empirical studies like Raine’s indicate that 
functional impairments are at least correlated with violence.100  A question 
then arises regarding who is qualified to make decisions regarding how 
neuroscience should be and can be used in criminal trials, or how 
neuroscience will be weighed and applied in the sentencing phase.   
C. The Appropriate Role of Judges Versus Experts Is Uncertain 
Because neurolaw is a burgeoning field and neuroscience is 
increasingly being offered as evidence in the courtroom, it is important to 
understand the capacity of judges to effectively use neuroscientific evidence 
when sentencing offenders.101  Judges often need guidance concerning the 
applicability and viability of neurological evidence.102  As is mentioned in 
the previous subsection, because neuroscientific studies are based on group 
data,103 it is particularly important that neuroscientists help decision-makers 
avoid under-interpreting and over-interpreting neuroscientific evidence 
concerning causation and correlation issues.104  Joshua Buckholtz, 
psychologist at Harvard, says “[t]he task of integrating brain science into the 
judicial system will in large part be the responsibility of judges,” and how it 
works will depend on how well judges understand “what a scientific study is 
and what it says and what it doesn’t say and can’t say.”105  Judges, on the 
whole, have little training in, knowledge of, or inclination to learn science.106 
They regularly rely on applied science as an integral part of lawmaking, 
meaning it is necessary that judges understand probabilities and statistics.107  
                                                
98  Id. at 59.   
99  Id. at 71–72. 
100  RAINE, supra note 18, at 68. 
101  See Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, supra note 63, at 733. 
102  Id.   
103  Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, supra note 60, at 625. 
104  Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, supra note 63, at 734. 
105  Jon Hamilton, The Case Against Brain Scans As Evidence In Court, SHOTS HEALTH NEWS FROM 
NPR (Nov. 12, 2013, 3:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/11/12/244566090/brain-
scans-shouldnt-get-their-day-in-court-scientists-say. 
106  David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2006). 
107  Id. 
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The idea that judges may not be the best qualified to weigh 
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom provokes questions surrounding 
who is best equipped to apply neuroscience to the law.  There is concern that 
the sentencing judge may not be the actor best qualified to determine how 
evidence of a cognitive impairment may affect general or specific deterrence 
or an offender’s moral culpability, and therefore, if or to what extent a brain 
impairment should serve as a mitigating factor.  Thus, although Professor 
Jones asserts that the engagement of law with neuroscientific evidence was 
inevitable,108 there remains uncertainty surrounding the relationship between 
a cognitive impairment and the commission of an offense, and concerning 
the actor best suited to make definitive judgments about this relationship and 
its effect on an offender’s sentence.  The application of neuroscience to the 
law therefore remains limited in scope. 
IV. SIX CASE STUDIES FROM NEW SOUTH WALES LEND INSIGHT INTO THE 
USE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN SENTENCING 
Neuroscientific evidence of an offender’s cognitive impairment may be 
introduced as a consideration in sentencing in New South Wales.109 
However, based on six case studies from New South Wales, analyzed here 
for the first time as a set with respect to the weight given to neuroscientific 
evidence, it is clear that sentencing judges resist using neurological evidence 
alone to mitigate violent offenders' sentences.  The following six cases 
illustrate how New South Wales courts applied, either by name or more 
generally, the Principles articulated in case law and delineated in Part II.  
These Principles include the impairment’s effect on the general or specific 
deterrence value of imprisonment, if the impairment would cause the 
sentence to weigh more heavily on the offender by comparison to the 
average inmate, and if the impairment warrants reduced moral culpability, or 
conversely, if the impairment warrants an enhanced sentence due to 
increased danger to the community.110  First, I will present three cases 
demonstrating circumstances in which courts are more likely to find that an 
offender’s impairment warrants a reduction in sentencing.  I will contrast 
those cases with three cases illustrating circumstances in which courts resist 
mitigating an offender’s sentence based on evidence of a cognitive 
impairment.  I summarize these cases in Table 1 at the end of this section. 
                                                
108  Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, supra note 60, at 735. 
109  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).   
110  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).   
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A. Circumstances in which Evidence of an Offender’s Cognitive 
Impairment Is Used as a Significant Mitigating Factor 
1. R v Terrence David Kain111  
On February 27, 2011, after a fight with his mother, Mr. Kain claims 
that he remembers pushing her and then seeing her lying beside the bed, 
dead.112  Mr. Kain is an alcoholic and suffers from depression, which has 
manifested in self-harming behaviors.113 Clinical neuropsychologist, Dr.  
Hepner, whose results were accepted by both the prosecution and defense, 
asserted that Mr. Kain's heavy drinking likely lead to impairment of his 
executive functioning, and that 98% of Mr. Kain's peers, matched for age 
and other background characteristics, would perform better than him if 
tested on executive functioning.114  Dr. Hepner concluded that there is no 
doubt Mr. Kain suffers from an alcohol-induced persisting dementia.115  In 
addition, an MRI brain study conducted in 2012 showed diffuse brain 
damage, likely from alcoholism.116  The effects of damage to the frontal part 
of the brain, including poor judgment and lack of behavioral control, are 
exacerbated in times of anger or emotional stress as they would have been 
during Mr. Kain’s fight with his mother.117   
Although manslaughter carries a maximum term of 25 years, the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales held that Mr. Kain’s case “should [not] 
attract the maximum sentence or anything near it.”118  The Court noted that 
Mr. Kain entered a guilty plea at the commencement of his trial, did not 
have a criminal history, and showed genuine remorse.119  The Court 
primarily relied on Mr. Kain’s impaired executive functioning in mitigating 
his sentence,120 and found that “his mental condition is obviously of 
considerable importance in measuring his moral and criminal 
responsibility”.121  Writing for the Court, Justice Adams asserted, “I have no 
doubt . . . that . . . [Mr. Kain’s] loss of control was substantially influenced 
by his dementia.  In short, if Mr. Kain had not suffered from this condition, I 
                                                
111  R v Terrence David Kain [2013] NSWSC 638 (24 May 2013) (Austl.).  
112  Id. at 8. 
113  Id. at 12–13. 
114  Id. at 15. 
115  Id. at 17. 
116  Id. at 16. 
117  Id. at 17. 
118  Id. at 1. 
119  Id. at 25, 30. 
120  Id. at 11. 
121  Id. at 24. 
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think it very improbable indeed that he would have acted as he did.”122  As a 
result of Mr. Kain's psychiatric condition, the Court found that Mr. Kain was 
not an appropriate vehicle for deterrence, was not a danger to the public, and 
that his mental condition would make prison more challenging for him than 
the ordinary prisoner.123 The Court sentenced Mr. Kain to a non-parole 
period of four years.124 
2. EG v R125 
In February of 2013, the applicant was caring for his four 
grandchildren until his daughter-in-law arrived to collect them.126  It had 
been a difficult afternoon when his two-year-old granddaughter said she 
needed to be changed.127  While she was on the changing table with no 
clothing on the lower part of her body, he bent down and licked her on the 
outside of her vagina.128  He admitted to doing so.129 The applicant said he 
did not know why he did it and had never done anything of the kind to any 
other child.130 
Psychiatrist, Dr. Nielssen, diagnosed the applicant with mild 
dementia.131 Dr. Nielssen noted that an MRI scan of the brain showed 
widespread small vessel disease, as well as a stroke affecting the temporal 
and parietal lobes of the brain.132  He noted the applicant’s slow response 
time and lethargic emotional responses, which were consistent with the 
diagnosis.133  Although Dr. Nielssen concluded that any connection between 
those conditions and the commission of the offense was unclear, he noted 
that the applicant reported changes in his usual behavior, and Dr. Nielssen 
formed the opinion that the applicant may have had a loss of judgment and 
inhibition as a result of the effects of the stroke and widespread 
                                                
122  Id. at 22. 
123  Id.  at 27, 29. 
124  Id.  at 32. 
125  EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21 (3 March 2015) (Austl.).   
126  Id. at 6. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 7. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 7–8. 
131  Id. at 13. 
132  Id. at 13–14. 
133  Id. at 13. 
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cerebrovascular disease.134  Further, the applicant recognized what he had 
done was wrong.135 
The District Court sentenced the applicant to imprisonment with a 
non-parole period of two years and six months.136  The maximum penalty for 
aggravated sexual intercourse with a child under ten years of age is 
imprisonment for life137 and a standard non-parole period of 15 years.138  On 
appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the sentence imposed by the 
sentencing judge was manifestly excessive.139  The Court determined that 
the principles of sentencing relevant to cases involving child sexual abuse, 
including general deterrence, denunciation, and protection of the 
community, attracted little weight given the unusual nature of the case.140 
The Court found that the applicant’s mental condition, supported by the MRI 
scan, could have adversely affected his judgment, and the fact that the 
applicant could neither understand nor explain his actions made specific 
deterrence and protection of the community less significant.141  Because the 
factual circumstances were so unusual and there was no sexual gratification 
element, the Court found that although denunciation required a term of 
imprisonment, the applicant’s sentence should be mitigated.142  Ultimately, 
the Court held that due to the applicant’s age, deteriorating mental condition, 
and its relation to and the nature of the offense, a mitigated sentence of a 
non-parole period of one year would be more just.143  
3. Carroll v R144  
On January 5, 2010, applicant Peter Carroll pulled his vehicle in front 
of the victim, Anthony Staunch’s van.145  Mr. Staunch had to brake suddenly 
to avoid a collision, and shook his head in disapproval.146  Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Carroll stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road, causing Mr.  
Staunch to brake again, and an argument ensued.147  Mr. Carroll grabbed a 
                                                
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 2. 
137  Id. at 1. 
138  Id.   
139  Id. at 45. 
140  Id. at 42. 
141  Id. at 41–42. 
142  Id. at 43–46. 
143  Id. at 44–48. 
144  Carroll v R [2010] 239 FLR 11 (NSWCCA) (Austl.).   
145  Id. at 9. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 10–11. 
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knife from his vehicle, at which point Mr. Staunch returned to his van to 
protect himself.148  Mr. Carroll cut Mr. Staunch on his right forearm and 
inflicted a slash across Mr. Staunch’s face from his mouth towards his ear 
before speeding off.149  Mr. Carroll plead guilty to wounding with intent to 
cause grievous bodily harm.150 
Dr. Allnutt issued a psychiatric report of Mr. Carroll on behalf of the 
defense and not subject to cross-examination by the Crown.151  He found 
that Mr. Carroll had suffered a head injury with loss of consciousness and 
had been diagnosed with a seizure disorder secondary to the head injury.152  
Mr. Carroll expressed to Dr. Allnutt that there had been a change in his 
behavior and he had become more irritable and more prone to aggression.153  
Dr. Allnutt noted his suspicion that Mr. Carroll likely had lobe damage, 
contributing to a diminished capacity for self-control and vulnerability to 
acting impulsively and aggressively.154  He concluded that it was unlikely 
Mr. Carroll’s disorder played a direct role in the offense, but his cognitive 
impairments could have.155  Mr. Carroll also expressed remorse and a desire 
to apologize to the victim.156  Although Mr. Carroll had a criminal history 
involving multiple assaults,157 in the ten years prior to the offense he had 
only one offense involving violence for which he was fined, meaning it 
involved a low level of criminality.158  
The Court of Criminal Appeal found that the sentencing judge wrongly 
held Mr. Carroll’s mental state did not in any way contribute to the 
commission of the offense and should have considered how either general or 
specific deterrence may have been reduced, or if Mr. Carroll’s moral 
culpability should have been mitigated.159  The Court articulated the 
applicable Principles to illustrate the ways in which mental illness or 
disorder may be relevant and noted that the application of the Principles is 
not limited to cases of serious psychiatric illness.160  The Court found that 
                                                
148  Id. at 13. 
149  Id. at 16. 
150  Id. at 4–5.   
151  Id. at 23, 26. 
152  Id. at 30. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 38–39. 
158  Id. at 40. 
159  Id. at 60. 
160  Id. at 57–58. 
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because Mr. Carroll suffered two head injuries, which lead to neurological 
complications manifesting in seizures and causing poor temper control, Mr. 
Carroll’s mental state did impact the commission of the offense and should 
have been taken into account in sentencing.161 Ultimately, the Court held 
that “significant weight must be given when determining a sentence to the 
impact that the applicant’s head injuries have had on his behavior . . . it 
seems obvious . . . that poor temper control played a significant role . . . .”162 
Although the standard non-parole period for wounding or grievous bodily 
harm with intent is seven years, and the sentencing judge imposed a non-
parole period of six years, the Court found that a mitigated non-parole period 
of four years was more appropriate.163   
B. Circumstances in which Evidence of an Offender’s Cognitive 
Impairment Is Not Used as a Significant Mitigating Factor 
1. Aslan v R164 
Mr. Aslan, whose case is briefly discussed in the Introduction, was 
convicted of one count of indecent assault, one of attempted sexual 
intercourse without consent, and two of sexual intercourse without 
consent.165  As previously mentioned, Mr. Aslan suffered maltreatment as a 
child and neurological assessments after two motor vehicle accidents 
revealed that Mr. Aslan had brain damage.166  He was diagnosed with severe 
depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder,167 and a clinical 
neuropsychologist reported that Mr. Aslan’s dysfunction in executive 
functioning, including inhibition difficulties, was consistent with post-
concussional disorder associated with traumatic brain injury.168  After Mr.  
Aslan was charged, psychiatrist, Dr. Allnutt, reported that Aslan possibly 
suffered ongoing cognitive difficulties as a consequence of his head injury, 
such as impulsivity and poor judgment.169  In addition, Mr. Aslan manifested 
symptoms consistent with persistent drug-induced psychotic symptoms 
likely related to his long-term substance abuse history.170 
                                                
161  Id. at 61, 63. 
162  Id. at 102-–03. 
163  Id. at 6–7, 108. 
164  Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).   
165  Id. at 1. 
166  Id. at 13. 
167  Id. at 15. 
168  Id. at 24. 
169  Id. at 19. 
170  Id. 
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Dr. Allnutt testified on behalf of the defense that at the time of the 
alleged offense,  Mr. Aslan was experiencing ongoing cognitive problems 
derived from his head injury, and was also suffering from blackouts where 
he would lose memory of events, likely from his long-term substance 
abuse.171 Although the sentencing judge accepted that “the injury left Aslan 
with less capacity to exercise care and judgment as to the use of . . . drugs 
and alcohol . . .,” he did “not accept . . . that there was any direct impact of 
the acquired brain injury on . . . [Mr. Aslan’s] offending . . . .”172  The 
District Court therefore found that Mr. Aslan’s cognitive impairment did not 
reduce his moral culpability, though it would make Mr. Aslan’s prison term 
more onerous, “moderat[ing] to a very small degree the requirements calling 
for general deterrence.”173  On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal noted 
that it has had to grapple with the effect on sentencing of mental illness, 
intellectual handicap, or mental or emotional impairment.174  A “central 
question” is whether the condition had a “causative role to play” in the 
commission of the offense, in which case it is at the court’s discretion to 
mitigate the sentence based on a finding of reduced moral culpability or 
specific or general deterrence.175  The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the 
District Court’s holding that Mr. Aslan’s brain injury did not directly 
influence the commission of the offense and affirmed the sentence of a non-
parole period of six years.176 
2. R v Lane177  
On February 20, 2010, Tanya Lane shot Renae Burns’ long-time 
partner, Steven Quire.178  Some weeks later, his body was found buried in a 
shallow grave.179  Ms. Lane and Ms. Burns were in an intimate 
relationship.180  Although there was uncertainty concerning the degree to 
which Ms. Burns, who pled guilty as an accessory after the fact,181 was 
                                                
171  Id. at 20. 
172  Id. at 26. 
173  Id. at 25. 
174  Id. at 33.   
175  Id. at 34–35. 
176  Id. at 3, 51. 
177  R v.  Lane [2013] 241 A Crim R 321 (NSWSC) (Austl.). 
178  Id. at 3–4. 
179  Id. at 4. 
180  Id. at 3. 
181  Id. at 1. 
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involved in the shooting and burial,182 Ms. Lane pled guilty to Mr. Quire’s 
murder.183  
Ms. Lane was 25-years-old at the time of the murder and had no 
previous convictions.184  Ms. Lane had a difficult upbringing.185  At the age 
of six she was sexually abused by a member of her extended family and did 
not have a supportive relationship with her mother, whose partner was an 
alcoholic.186  She developed epilepsy at 16, and an MRI scan while she was 
in custody revealed long standing abnormalities of the brain that were likely 
of congenital origin.187  Psychologist, Dr. Reid, and psychiatrist, Dr.  
Nielssen, independently examined Ms. Lane on behalf of the defense.188 Dr.  
Reid concluded that Ms. Lane showed decline in her intellectual functions 
and deficits in her speed and flexibility of thinking, which was supported by 
the MRI’s indication of acquired brain impairment.189  Dr. Nielssen found 
that Ms. Lane’s significant anxiety and depression around the time of the 
offense in conjunction with her congenital brain conditions, should allow her 
to raise those issues in mitigation.190 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales accepted that Ms. Lane’s 
“mental problems” affected her judgment, but concluded they were more 
emotional than cognitive so she was not entitled to any marked degree of 
leniency.191  Although the standard non-parole period for murder is 20 years, 
the Court found that due to Ms. Lane’s prior good character, the nature of 
the offense, her guilty plea, and the statutory ratio required by the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act,192 it would impose a slightly mitigated non-
parole period of 17 years.193 
                                                
182  Id. at 2–14. 
183  Id. at 1. 
184  Id. at 17. 
185  Id. at 18. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  Id. at 17. 
189  Id. at 22. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 30. 
192  Section 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 requires the balance of the terms of 
the sentence not exceed one-third of the non-parole period for the sentence unless there are special 
circumstances, see Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) div 21A. 
193  R v Lane [2013] 241 A Crim R 321 (NSWSC) (Austl.). 
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3. R v Sullivan194  
On October 3, 2007, Mr. Prochilo went over to Mr. Sullivan's house, 
likely to purchase drugs or borrow money.195  Mr. Sullivan, thinking that Mr. 
Prochilo had stolen his wallet, met Mr. Prochilo in the doorway.196  They 
proceeded into the house, and after a brief struggle, Mr. Sullivan stabbed 
Mr. Prochilo in the chest.197  Mr. Prochilo died before emergency services 
arrived,198 and the jury found Mr. Sullivan guilty of murder.199  
More than two decades prior to the incident, Mr. Sullivan was the 
victim of an assault, resulting in a right parietal skull fracture, after which he 
was reported to be aggressive.200  In 1986, not long after the assault, Mr. 
Sullivan was convicted of manslaughter,201 after which an MRI scan 
confirmed a cerebral injury.202  Prior to Mr. Sullivan’s trial for the murder of 
Mr. Prochilo, Dr. Allnutt, on behalf of the defense, reviewed the results of 
previous neuropsychological testing and concluded that Mr. Sullivan 
suffered from a range of cognitive impairments suggesting frontal lobe 
damage, commonly associated with an increased risk of impulsive behavior 
and poor judgment.203  In addition, at the time of the offense, a number of 
elements likely influenced Mr. Sullivan’s actions, including his brain 
impairment, substance intoxication, and depressive symptoms.204  
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of New South Wales recited the 
four mitigating Principles that should be considered when an offender is 
mentally ill, in addition to the countervailing consideration that the offender 
presents an increased danger to the community.205  The Court recognized 
that Mr. Sullivan’s brain damage impacted his mental and psychosocial 
functioning, which increased the risk of him overreacting to Mr. Prochilo.206 
Although Mr. Sullivan's brain dysfunction slightly mitigated the need for 
general deterrence, it did not reduce Mr. Sullivan's moral culpability, in part 
                                                
194  R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.), aff’d, Sullivan v R [2012] NSWCCA 41 
(Austl.). 
195  R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.). 
196  Id. at 17. 
197  Id. at 15. 
198  Id. at 16, 20. 
199  Id. at 2. 
200  Id. at 44. 
201  Id. at 44–45. 
202  Id. at 55–56. 
203  Id. at 57. 
204  Id. at 65. 
205  Id. at 63. 
206  Id. 
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because the Court agreed with Dr. Allnutt’s assessment that it was one 
among many factors contributing to the commission of the offense.207  Mr. 
Sullivan's brain impairment was therefore not sufficiently causally related to 
qualify as an objective factor affecting the seriousness of the offense that 
could be used to significantly mitigate his sentence.208  The Court found that 
“despite…being satisfied that the probabilities favour the offender's brain 
damage as having some causal connection with the commission of the 
offence,” the standard non-parole period of 20 years “remains the most 
significant point of reference.”209  
The Court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by Mr. Sullivan’s 
previous conviction for manslaughter, and it determined that Mr. Sullivan 
posed a significant risk to community safety, which counteracted the 
mitigatory impact of his neurological and physiological dysfunction on his 
sentence.210   In addition, the court noted that Mr. Sullivan did not express 
remorse, but instead “expressed some satisfaction” at having killed Mr. 
Prochilo.211  Thus, although Mr. Sullivan’s cognitive injury had an impact, it 
did not assist him because the sentencing judge found it made him more 
dangerous such that the principle of community protection was given more 
weight in the sentence imposed.212  Mr. Sullivan was sentenced to a non-
parole period of eighteen years and nine months.213  
C.  Table 1: Summation of the Case Studies from New South Wales 
Table 1 summarizes each of the six case studies discussed above and 
delineates: whether the offender’s sentence was mitigated at least, in part, 
based on neuroscientific evidence of brain impairment; the offense 
committed with a brief statement of the facts; the offender’s cognitive 
impairment; evidence of the impairment; the sentence imposed with 
additional information about any applicable statutory maximum sentence 
and non-parole period; and the rationale for the sentence. 
                                                
207  Id. at 64. 
208  R v Sullivan was decided before Muldrock v The Queen and Martin v R, which created ambiguity 
regarding whether matters particular to the offender may influence the sentencing judge’s consideration of 
the objective seriousness of the offense or whether they are matters personal to the offender.  Muldrock v 
The Queen [2011] 249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.). 
209  R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.).  
210  Id. 
211  Id. at 22. 
212  Sullivan v R [2012] NSWSC 41 (Austl.). 
213  R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.). 
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Case Offense Cognitive 
Impairment 
Evidence of 
Impairment 
Sentence   
(non-parole 
period) 
Rationale for 
Sentence 
R v 
Terrence 
David Kain 
(2013) 
 
Mitigated 
Manslaughter  
 
(Strangled his 
mother) 
Alcohol-
induced 
persisting 
dementia; 
brain damage 
resulting in 
poor 
executive 
functioning, 
including poor 
judgment and 
lack of 
behavioral 
control 
Neuropsychol
ogical 
assessment; 
MRI 
4 years214 
 
(max of 25 
years)215 
Mitigated due to 
genuine remorse, lack 
of criminal history, 
guilty plea, and limited 
executive functioning; 
as a result of his 
psychiatric condition, 
Mr. Kain was not an 
appropriate vehicle for 
deterrence, was not a 
danger, and would face 
exceptional challenges 
in prison 
EG v R 
(2015) 
 
Mitigated 
Aggravated 
sexual 
intercourse 
with a child 
under ten years 
of age  
 
(Licked his 
two-year-old 
granddaughter’
s vagina) 
Mild 
dementia; 
widespread 
small vessel 
disease 
affecting the 
temporal and 
parietal lobes 
of the brain; 
loss of 
judgment and 
inhibition 
Neuropsychol
ogical 
assessment; 
MRI 
1 year 
 
(max of 
life;216 
standard 
non-parole 
period of 15 
years217) 
Mitigated from a non-
parole period of 2 
years, 6 months to 1 
year; Applicant’s 
mental condition could 
have affected his 
judgment, and due to 
the unusual factual 
circumstances and the 
absence of a 
gratification element, 
specific deterrence and 
protection of the 
community were less 
significant 
Carroll v R 
(2012) 
 
Grievous 
bodily harm 
with intent  
 
Seizure 
disorder due 
to head injury; 
likely lobe 
damage 
manifesting in 
Neuropsychol
ogical 
assessment; 
MRI 
4 years 
 
(max of 25 
years;218 
Mitigated from a non-
parole period of 6 
years to 4 years; 
although Mr.  Carroll 
had a criminal record, 
significant weight 
                                                
214  Although section 25B of the Crimes Act 1900 now requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 
eight years for Assault Causing Death when Intoxicated irrespective of section 21 of the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, the mandatory minimum was not required until 2014 when the Act was 
amended, see Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW). 
215  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 25, repealed by Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and 
Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW). 
216  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66A. 
217  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 10. 
218  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 33. 
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Case Offense Cognitive 
Impairment 
Evidence of 
Impairment 
Sentence   
(non-parole 
period) 
Rationale for 
Sentence 
Mitigated (Cut the 
victim’s 
forearm and 
face)  
lack of self-
control and 
impulsivity  
standard 
non-parole 
period of 7 
years219) 
should be given to the 
impact of Mr. Carroll’s 
head injuries and the 
resulting lack of temper 
control on his behavior; 
the sentencing judge 
should have considered 
the reduced deterrence 
value and moral 
culpability; Mr. Carroll 
also expressed remorse 
Aslan v R 
(2014) 
 
Not 
mitigated 
Indecent 
assault, 
attempted 
sexual 
intercourse 
without 
consent, sexual 
intercourse 
without 
consent 
 
(Raped the 
victim) 
Brain injury 
leading to a 
diagnosis of 
depression 
and executive 
dysfunction 
such as 
impulsivity 
and poor 
judgment  
Neuropsychol
ogical 
assessment 
Aggregate 
sentence of 
6 years 
 
([attempted] 
sexual 
intercourse 
without 
consent: 
max of 14 
years,220 
standard 
non-parole 
period of 7 
years;221 
indecent 
assault: max 
of 5 
years222) 
Although Mr. Aslan’s 
cognitive impairment 
would make his prison 
term more onerous, 
moderating to a very 
small degree the value 
of general deterrence, 
the Court did not 
accept that Mr.  
Aslan’s cognitive 
impairment had a direct 
impact on the offense 
and did not mitigate his 
sentence based on 
reduced moral 
culpability or specific 
or general deterrence 
R v Lane 
(2013) 
 
Not 
mitigated 
Murder 
 
(Shot and 
killed her 
lover’s long-
Anxiety and 
depression; 
epilepsy; 
sexually 
abused as a 
child; 
congenital 
brain 
Neuropsychol
ogical 
assessment; 
MRI 
17 years 
 
(max of 
life;223 
standard 
non-parole 
Because Ms. Lane’s 
mental problems were 
more emotional than 
cognitive, she was not 
entitled to any marked 
degree of leniency and 
was awarded a slightly 
lesser sentence only 
                                                
219  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 4. 
220  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61I. 
221  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 7. 
222  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61L. 
223  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 19A. 
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Case Offense Cognitive 
Impairment 
Evidence of 
Impairment 
Sentence   
(non-parole 
period) 
Rationale for 
Sentence 
time partner) impairments; 
decline in 
intellectual 
functioning  
period of 20 
years224) 
because she plead 
guilty 
R v 
Sullivan 
(2010) 
 
Not 
mitigated 
Murder 
 
(Stabbed the 
victim in the 
chest) 
Depressive 
symptoms; 
parietal skull 
fracture; 
cognitive 
impairments 
suggestive of 
frontal lobe 
damage 
associated 
with 
impulsive 
behavior and 
poor judgment 
Neuropsychol
ogical 
assessment; 
MRI 
18 years and 
9 months 
 
(max of 
life;225 
standard 
non-parole 
period of 20 
years226) 
Mr. Sullivan’s brain 
impairment was not 
sufficiently causally 
related to the offense to 
qualify as a mitigating 
factor beyond a slight 
mitigation in general 
deterrence; Mr.  
Sullivan’s previous 
conviction for 
manslaughter and risk 
to community safety 
counteracted the 
impact of his 
neurological and 
physiological 
dysfunction on his 
sentence 
V. NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS NEITHER CONSISTENTLY NOR 
ROBUSTLY USED TO MITIGATE OFFENDERS’ SENTENCES IN NEW SOUTH 
WALES 
Professor Jones cautions that “[Neuroscience] is one of those things 
that holds both promise and terror for the legal system.”227  However, the six 
case studies reveal that currently, neuroscientific evidence does not play a 
significant role in the legal system in New South Wales, even though judges 
have the discretionary capacity to allocate it more weight in sentencing, 
because it is not sufficiently developed to be applied consistently in 
sentencing or offer significant insight into the criminal mind.  The cases 
indicate that neuroscientific evidence is not understood well enough to serve 
as more than a discretionary tool of the sentencing judge that is sometimes 
                                                
224  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 1. 
225  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 19A. 
226  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 1. 
227  Davis, supra note 21. 
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used to mitigate an offender’s sentence and sometimes not, absent any 
identifiable pattern among cases.   
One of the purposes of the application of neuroscience to the law is to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the psychology of criminal 
responsibility.  It is apparent from the case studies, however, that the 
criminal mind remains elusive; in many cases, neuroscientific evidence is 
unable to definitively determine the nature of the relationship between an 
offender's brain impairment and the offense, or in some cases, the strength of 
the relationship between them.  The case studies indicate that there is no 
identifiable trend in how neuroscientific evidence is used to mitigate an 
offender’s sentence; however, evidence of an offender’s cognitive 
impairment appears to bear more weight and serve as more of a mitigating 
influence in the presence of other favorable circumstances.  In addition, 
judges’ seemingly arbitrary evaluation of the weight of neuroscientific 
evidence of offenders’ brain impairments in some circumstances suggests 
that judges may not currently have the expertise to apply neuroscience in 
sentencing. 
A. Mitigation Based on a Cognitive Impairment Is More Likely 
when There Are Other Factors Favorable to the Defendant 
These case studies illustrate that a court is more likely to mitigate an 
offender’s sentence seemingly based on neurological evidence of a cognitive 
impairment when there are other factors favorable to an offender as in Mr.  
Kain’s case, in EG v R, and in Mr. Carroll’s case.  These factors may include 
no criminal history, an expression of remorse, or factual circumstances that 
appear out of character for the offender, indicating, for example, a lesser risk 
of recidivism and reduced potential danger to the public.  However, when 
there are adverse factors, evidence of a cognitive impairment appears to 
have little influence or may be counteracted by a factor unfavorable to the 
offender, as in Mr. Sullivan’s case.  Therefore, evidence of cognitive 
dysfunction, in isolation, does not play an influential role in mitigation, but 
is just one among many factors, which, taken holistically, determine an 
offender’s sentence.  In addition, the great discretion a court exercises in 
sentencing means a sentencing judge may weigh neuroscientific evidence 
however he or she pleases, which leads to the type of inconsistency that is 
illustrated by the cases regarding how evidence of a brain impairment is 
used in each offender’s sentencing proceeding.   
June 2017 The Criminal Mind  687 
 
 
 
In R v Terrence David Kain, the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
mitigated Mr. Kain’s sentence primarily due to his alcohol-induced 
persisting dementia and brain damage resulting in poor executive 
functioning, but also considered his lack of criminal history, his guilty plea, 
and genuine remorse.  Similarly, in EG v R, the Court of Criminal Appeal 
held that the offender’s widespread small vessel disease affecting his brain 
function warranted mitigation in the context of the unusual factual 
circumstances and the offender’s lack of criminal history.  In Carroll v R, 
the Court of Criminal Appeal found that Mr. Carroll’s head injury, resulting 
in frontal lobe damage, contributed to his lack of temper control and 
consequently, his commission of the offense, which warranted mitigation.  
Notable is the fact that Mr. Carroll expressed remorse and a desire to 
apologize to the victim.  Although Mr. Carroll had a criminal history, 
including a number of offenses involving assault, in the ten years prior to the 
offense Mr. Carroll had only one violent offense for which he was merely 
fined.  The Court found that Mr.  Carroll’s sole offense the decade prior to 
the current offense seemingly involved a low level of criminality, and 
therefore did not appear to use his criminal history as an influential factor in 
sentencing.  Mr. Carroll’s case is a prime example of the discretion a court 
yields in sentencing concerning how to weigh a defendant’s criminal history 
in addition to other subjective factors, which leads to inconsistencies in 
sentencing.   
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held in R v Lane 
that although Ms. Lane had some congenital brain impairments, the impact 
of which were uncertain, and a host of emotional challenges, her mental 
difficulties were not sufficiently cognitively based to serve as a mitigating 
factor.  Ms. Lane’s case speaks to the uncertainty surrounding neuroscience, 
how it should be used in the courtroom, and if the sentencing judge is the 
appropriate actor to make the determination of how brain impairment 
influences an offender’s sentence, addressed below. 
In R v Sullivan, the Supreme Court of New South Wales found that Mr. 
Sullivan’s cognitive impairments resulting from a skull fracture were not 
sufficiently causally related to the offense to significantly mitigate his 
sentence.  In addition, the Court held that Mr. Sullivan’s previous conviction 
for manslaughter and consequent danger to the public counteracted the 
minor mitigating influence of his impairment.  It is important to note that 
there is not stronger evidence of the effect of Mr. Carroll’s cognitive 
impairment on his commission of the offense than in Mr. Sullivan’s case.  
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While both Mr. Carroll and Mr. Sullivan had criminal history, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal did not characterize Mr. Carroll’s criminal history as 
serious and noted that he expressed remorse, while the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales held that Mr. Sullivan’s criminal history outweighed the 
influence of his impairment and noted that Mr. Sullivan expressed 
satisfaction as opposed to remorse at having killed the deceased.  
Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that significant weight 
should be given to Mr. Carroll’s cognitive impairment, which resulted in 
mitigation, whereas the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that Mr.  
Sullivan’s criminal history outweighed the influence of his impairment.  
Thus, it appears not only that the mitigation Principles were weighted 
differently in each case, but also that the neuroscientific evidence was not 
applied consistently.   
Also notable is that no offender’s sentence from any of the six cases 
was significantly mitigated due to Principle 1 articulated in case law: 
reduced moral culpability.  In fact, in Aslan v R, the District Court judge 
made explicit that Mr. Aslan’s frontal lobe damage did not warrant a 
mitigated sentence based on reduced moral culpability.  However, there are 
examples where the court, on appeal, has found reduced moral culpability 
based on a cognitive impairment.228  At least some cases in which the New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has considered moral culpability a 
mitigating factor, including Barbieri v R, Martin v R, and Cowan v R, 
involve the Court of Appeal finding the District Court erred in sentencing 
either because it did not consider moral culpability in sentencing or because 
it did not find that moral culpability was a substantially mitigating factor.229  
Unlike specific or general deterrence value, moral culpability is more 
subjective and stems from retributive principles or the notion that the 
offender is deserving of punishment because of the harm he or she 
inflicted.230  The six case studies and the three cases listed above indicate 
                                                
228  See, e.g., Barbieri v R [2016] NSWCCA 295 (12 December 2016) (Austl.); see also Martin v R 
[2015] NSWCCA 48–53 (10 February 2015) (Austl.); see also Cowan v R [2015] NSWCCA 188 (29 May 
2015) (Austl.).  
229  See Barbieri at 1 (holding that it was erroneous to conclude the applicant’s moral culpability was 
not reduced to any substantial degree); see also Martin at 56, 60 (finding that the District Court should have 
assessed whether the applicant’s moral culpability was reduced and holding that the applicant’s moral 
culpability was slightly reduced due to his mental disorders); see also Cowan at 6, 69 (finding that the 
District Court should have considered the applicant’s moral culpability as a mitigating factor).   
230  See RAINE, supra note 18, at 319; see also Allan McCay & Jeanette Kennett, Can neuroscience 
revolutionise the way we punish criminals? Retributivism is still alive and well, INDEPENDENT (May 30, 
2016, 3:31 BST), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/can-neuroscience-revolutionise-the-way-we-
punish-criminals-a7056476.html. 
June 2017 The Criminal Mind  689 
 
 
 
that there is ambiguity concerning the application of the moral culpability 
reduction principle.  Reluctance to reduce an offender’s moral culpability 
solely based on a cognitive impairment, at least by the District Court, may 
implicate the philosophical underpinnings of the criminal justice system and 
suggest that society is not prepared to recognize that evidence of a brain 
impairment should or could allow an offender to avoid receiving his or her 
just deserts.   
B. The Sentencing Judge May Not Yet Possess the Necessary 
Expertise to Apply Neuroscience in the Courtroom 
As noted in the previous section, the case studies illustrate that the 
judiciary may not be the most qualified body to weigh neurological evidence 
of an offender’s cognitive impairment in sentencing proceedings.  In R v 
Lane, an MRI showed brain abnormalities likely of a congenital origin.  In 
addition, two experts who independently examined Ms.  Lane testified that 
the MRI showed she suffered from brain impairment, rsulting in reduced 
intellectual functioning and flexibility of thinking, and recommended that 
she raise her impairment as a mitigating factor.  Despite the experts’ 
findings, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that due to the 
emotional background of her killing her lover’s long-time partner, her 
impairments were more emotional than cognitive and therefore should not 
serve as a significant mitigating influence.   
The sentencing judge’s determination is problematic for two reasons.  
First, the judge effectively disregarded the experts’ testimony and made his 
or her own determination of the effect of Ms. Lane’s impairment on her 
behavior.  Second, the sentencing judge made a stark distinction between 
emotion and cognition, which Professor Raine suggests cannot be done so 
easily.  For example, Professor Raine discusses how abnormalities in the 
prefrontal cortex can manifest at numerous functional levels, including both 
an emotional and a cognitive level.  Manifestation at an emotional level 
could include anger, while manifestation at a cognitive level could include 
loss of intellectual flexibility.  The experts in Ms. Lane’s case emphasized 
how her impairment affected her intellectual function and therefore 
identified dysfunction on a cognitive level.  However, the sentencing judge 
decided that in Ms. Lane’s case, her “mental problems” affected her more on 
an emotional level due to the emotional background of the killing.  The 
judge’s determination, therefore, does not account for the ability of a 
structural abnormality to manifest at numerous levels, including both 
emotional and cognitive.  Further, the Principles that a court should consider 
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in sentencing individuals with a mental illness, intellectual handicap or other 
mental or emotional impairment or disability, make clear that the Principles 
should be considered if the individual has a mental or emotional impairment. 
Also seemingly arbitrary was the judge’s determination in Aslan v R 
that Mr. Aslan’s brain impairment did not directly influence his commission 
of the offense.  Psychiatrist, Dr. Allnutt, testified that Mr. Aslan suffered 
behavioral ramifications, including impulsivity, likely as a result of 
traumatic brain injury from two motor vehicle accidents.  Although the 
sentencing judge determined that Mr. Aslan’s brain injury could make him 
more susceptible to abusing drugs and alcohol, the judge found that Mr.  
Aslan’s impairment did not play a causative role concerning the incident.  
Similar to Ms. Lane’s case, the judge’s findings of cause and effect do not 
appear to be supported by either expert opinion or other neuroscientific 
evidence.   
Ms. Lane and Mr. Aslan’s cases make clear that the sentencing judge 
may draw conclusions about the relationship between an offender’s brain 
impairment and the offense completely independent of, and sometimes 
contrary to, expert opinion, scientific studies or neuroscientific tools.  In his 
article, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” Professor Faigman asserts that 
“judges, on the whole, have little training in, knowledge of, or inclination to 
learn science.”231 To be better equipped to apply neuroscience to sentencing, 
an arena largely entrusted to the judiciary, judges should make it an 
imperative to become inclined to learn science; as neurolaw continues to 
develop and play a more prominent role in criminal law, judges must adapt 
to changing circumstances to adequately uphold the aims of sentencing, 
including specific and general deterrence, public safety, and retribution, and 
for the posterity of the criminal justice system more generally.232  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
As neuroscience continues to evolve, the relationship between an 
offender’s cognitive impairment and criminal responsibility may become 
                                                
231  Faigman, supra note 106, at 1207 (2006). 
232  For further discussion regarding why judges must be better versed in science to be effective 
jurists, see Faigman, supra note 106.  See also Leanne Houston & Amy Vierboom, Neuroscience and Law: 
Australia, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 19 (T.M.  Spranger ed., 2012) (explaining that fMRI lie-detection 
data, introduced in the guilt phase of criminal trials, cannot be treated as conclusive evidence and require 
legal practitioners to defer to scientific expertise because there remains subjective criteria of intention.) The 
use of fMRI lie-detection data in the guilt phase can be analogized to neuroscientific evidence in sentencing 
and suggests that a judge’s role cannot be subverted by that of experts.   
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more certain.  Currently, however, the application of neuroscientific 
evidence in sentencing in New South Wales is limited.  Although Dr. Raine 
identifies how reduced prefrontal cortex functioning results in impaired 
functioning at an emotional, behavioral, personality, social, and cognitive 
level, neuroscientists cannot identify a definitive causal link between 
reduced cognitive functioning and the commission of an offense.  This lack 
of certainty means that the sentencing judge retains the discretion to decide 
if and how to weigh evidence of an impairment, which begs the question as 
to whether the judiciary is the body best suited to understand the intersection 
between science and the law and to make those determinations.  The six case 
studies indicate that judges do not possess sufficient understanding of 
neuroscience to use neurological evidence in sentencing consistently, and I 
assert that they should prioritize familiarizing themselves with science so as 
to adapt to scientific developments.  An additional consideration for future 
research should therefore concern the inherent biases of each sentencing 
judge and his or her familiarity with and perception of the utility of 
neuroscientific evidence.   
Evidence of a cognitive impairment becomes just one more factor 
among the many aggravating and mitigating factors that a sentencing judge 
considers holistically when making a sentencing determination.  My analysis 
of the six case studies illustrates that neuroscientific evidence of a cognitive 
impairment is nothing more than one factor among many, and does not serve 
as a significant mitigating influence unless there are other factors favorable 
to the defendant, such as a guilty plea or good character, which, taken 
together, encourage a more lenient sentence.  The cases also indicate that 
there is not a consensus regarding how or if an offender’s cognitive 
impairment translates into reduced moral culpability and thereby warrants a 
mitigated sentence.  Judges’ reluctance to find that a cognitive impairment 
may mean an offender is not as deserving of punishment maintains broader 
implications about the retributivist aim233 of the criminal justice system.  For 
now, punishment still matters in New South Wales, and until neuroscience 
offers further insight into the criminal mind, it will not provide a strong 
incentive for mitigation in sentencing. 
                                                
233  See Houston & Vierboom, Neuroscience and Law: Australia, supra note 233 (asserting that not all 
sense of “punishment” could be eliminated, even in a system of restorative justice, because it is a form of 
recompense to the victim and is a fundamental tenet of the legal system).   
